For its part, the German Government believes that the agreement on which it has just concluded with Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom and which it considers to be a permanent and final agreement with effect today between the two governments will facilitate the conclusion of a general agreement on this issue between all the maritime powers of the world. The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 and The Aspect of Appeasement On 22 May 1935, the British cabinet voted for Hitler`s offers of 21 May to be officially followed as soon as possible. Sir Eric Phipps, the United Kingdom`s ambassador to Berlin, advised London that „due to French short-sightedness“ no chance of a maritime agreement with Germany be lost. Chatfield informed the firm that it was very unwise to „refuse offer, but the Reactions of the French towards them are more uncertain and their reaction to our own battleship replacement even more so.“ The requirement for the Navy to divide its tonnage by 35% by class of warships led the Germans to build a symmetrical shipbuilding program of the „balanced fleet“, reflecting the priorities of the United Kingdom. Given that Royal Navy leaders believed that the „balanced fleet“ would be the easiest German fleet to defeat and that a German guerrilla fleet was the most dangerous, the agreement brought considerable strategic benefits to the United Kingdom. Especially since the Royal Navy did not build „pocket boatmen,“ Chatfield appreciated the end of the armoured ship building. d) The German Government supports the issue of maritime armament limitation, the system that divides naval vessels into categories, sets the maximum tonnage and/or armament of ships in each category and assigns tonnage to each power per class of vessels. As a result, the German government is prepared to apply the 35% in principle and subject (f) below. the tonnage of each category of vessels to be expected and any change in that report, in a given category or category, to the provisions that may be achieved under a future general sea vessel limitation contract, these provisions based on the principle that any increase in one category would be offset by a corresponding reduction in the other category.
If no general maritime restriction treaty is concluded or if the future general treaty does not contain a provision that creates a category restriction, the German government has the right to vary the 35 per cent. The relationship between one or more categories will be established by mutual agreement between the German government and Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom, taking into account the maritime situation that existed at the time. For these reasons, it would have been wise, to say the least, for the British to rehabilitate Mr von Ribbentrop, that the construction of the 420,000 tonnes granted to the Empire should be spread over seven or eight years, that the kiele not be fixed for this tonnage according to the maximum capacity of the German shipyards, which can build an average of 100,000 tonnes in a year. There is no doubt that the English negotiators wanted to keep such a promise on the part of the Germans. But they did not succeed. On 29 June, the French Ambassador to London received the communication on the German naval programme for only one year in 1935. It`s 115,000 tons. If this is considered a report, all the 420,000 tons that the British will give to the German navy will be fully built and commissioned by 1939. Why so much fuss? Shouldn`t Germany`s approval be bowed forever before British naval domination is welcomed with joy by all the friends of peace and all the supporters of the 1919 treaties? Has British maritime domination not been regarded for decades as one of the most important instruments for safeguarding the freedoms of Europe, the most dubious adversary of a nation that plans to place the European continent under its domination? June 1935 was a maritime agreement between Great Britain and Germany that regulated the size of the navy with regard to the Royal Navy.